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* 
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† 
 
Literature regarding the pricing efficiency of Australian wholesale vegetable markets is very 
limited. The objective of this paper is to test whether or not vegetable products traded in these 
markets are priced efficiently and satisfy the law of one price (LOOP). To that end, the price 
relationships between Adelaide and Melbourne markets are tested, using the Johansen 
cointegration approach, Granger causality and impulse response functions. The empirical 
findings do not appear to satisfy the LOOP. Policy implications of the analysis are explored.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Australian wholesale vegetable markets have recently attracted much attention of government 
bodies and growers. In 2008, after a prolonged period of high food prices the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) released a report analysing the 
competitiveness of the Australian food supply chain. Due to a lack of empirical data available, 
the ACCC drew the largely analytically-based conclusion that “the wholesale market(s) appears 
to operate efficiently. Prices in the wholesale market appear to be set by supply and demand” 
(2008, p. 273). In this report, however, growers have also expressed concerns regarding the 
transparency of negotiations between wholesalers and retailers. This information asymmetry 
leads to reduced pricing efficiency and an inefficient allocation of resources, which may be 
caused by a lack of market information provided to market agents.  
 
Wholesale vegetable markets play an important role in the Australian vegetable supply chain. 
These markets are centralised and located between the farm production and the food retail stages 
of the food supply chain. Centralised markets are designed to reduce search costs between 
growers and retailers by bringing them together in one physical location (Kohls and Uhl 1998, 
p.36). The markets are where most of the food retail sector sources their produce (excluding 
major supermarket chains) (ACCC 2008). Also, the wholesale price is used as a reference price 
for alternative methods of procuring produce such as direct supply relationships, which are used 
by Australian major supermarket chains, between growers and retailers (Spencer 2004).  
Therefore, the market performance of Australian wholesale vegetable markets is important to the 
entire vegetable supply chain. 
 
Market performance is broadly judged by two types of efficiency: operating and pricing. 
Operating efficiency relates to the optimising of the output to input ratio (Kohls and Uhl 1998, 
p.36). In turn, the operating efficiency of these markets is strongly influenced by its pricing 
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efficiency. Pricing efficiency is defined as the ability for prices to reflect all relevant information 
accurately, quickly and effectively (Williams and Stout 1964). Therefore, efficient pricing means 
that prices reflect a more competitive equilibrium, leading to more informed decision making in 
the wholesale markets and throughout the supply chain. 
 
Pricing efficiency is often measured using the law of one price (LOOP) (Sexton et al. 1991; 
Kohls and Uhl 1998, p. 157). Under competitive conditions, if the wholesale market agents are 
informed and rational, then arbitrage activity should occur between spatial locations, until prices 
reach equilibrium, net of transfer costs, unless these costs are excessive. In addition, efficient 
arbitrage implies that markets are highly competitive and that agents can gain no greater than 
market returns (Lohano and Mari 2006).  
 
The primary objective of this paper is to assess if the LOOP is satisfied in the Australian 
wholesale vegetable markets for the purpose of measuring pricing efficiency. This will be 
investigated by empirically testing the price relationship of a selection of the most produced and 
consumed vegetables in Australia. To this end, weekly average prices for Adelaide and 




Six billion dollars of sales and 25 million transactions per annum are estimated to occur in 
Australian wholesale vegetable markets (Brisbane Produce Markets Limited 2007). The 
Melbourne and Adelaide central markets generate 1.6 billion and 600 million dollars of sales of 
produce annually (Central Market Association of Australia 2007). Also, 53 per cent of growers 
sold a third of the total volume of vegetables at their local wholesale central market (Ashton 
2007, p.7). This figure is likely to be even higher, considering a further 19 per cent is sold 
interstate, a large proportion of which is expected to be traded at other central wholesale markets. 
The pricing efficiency of such large scale markets has a significant impact on the real incomes of 
growers, retailers and ultimately consumers of fresh vegetables. For markets to be price efficient, 
the LOOP must be satisfied. The LOOP requires markets to be competitive, and the ability for 
arbitrage to be executed between these central markets. An important requirement in any 
competitive market is for a high level of market information to be available to growers, 
wholesalers and retailers to permit informed decision making. The ability to conduct arbitrage 
activities relies on the condition that transfer costs are less than the price differential between 
locations. Transfer costs primarily consist of freight costs, although loading, unloading fees and 
arbitrage information costs are also included. If transfer costs are excessive, a market boundary 
will emerge and the LOOP relationship will not hold. 
 
Market information is comprised of any information about demand, supply, prices and inventory, 
in addition to government policies and other background factors affecting the market that the 
agent bases his/her actions (Weissel and Whittingham 1978, p.9). Market information generated 
in central markets is generally higher than in other market systems due to the concentration of 
buyers and sellers in the one physical location and the nature of the open cry system used (Kohls 
and Uhl 1998, p.159). A high level of market information being available to all agents has 
positive repercussions for pricing efficiency of the markets and the LOOP. Increased market 
information leads to improved decision making which results in price signals better reflecting the 3 
 
competitive market equilibrium. Hence, if there is a high level of market information, agents are 
informed about conditions in other central markets and, therefore, arbitrage activities may occur. 
The end result is the LOOP being satisfied. 
 
There has been a significant fall in the level of market information in central wholesale markets, 
since the removal of statutory vegetable marketing authorities in Australia. These authorities that 
were largely government sponsored included marketing boards, state and federal departments 
and industry organisations which provided an array of market information, including market 
assessments, prices, quantities and forecasts until the 1970s. Reliable volume and trade statistics 
for vegetables were largely available, as wholesale vegetables went through these statutory 
marketing boards and committees (Weissel and Whittingham, 1978, p.10). Currently, the only 
statutory marketing authority remaining is the Western Australian Potato Marketing Board. The 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics (ABARE) collect various industry statistics along with several industry groups such 
as Horticulture Australia Limited (HAL), although they are very limited in scope and often 
incompatible (Industry Commission 1993, p.44). Due to the bulky nature of produce, volume and 
trade data collection is a costly exercise which industry groups are not willing to fund, as 
marketing and research and development projects are seen as being more beneficial.  
Price information for fresh vegetables is available daily for all markets on a user pays basis from 
private consultants or from selected markets such as Adelaide and Melbourne. Price information 
is also reported on radio and through market reports. Within the market, price information is 
disseminated through the central market’s traditional open cry system. Wholesale price 
information faces several challenges. One is that prices can change rapidly intraday, where the 
average prices collected may not reflect this range. Also average price data and ranges do not 
reflect the variations in product quality which may be an important violation of the homogeneity 
assumption of competitive markets (Industry Commission 1993, p.44; Spencer 2004, p.60). 
Moreover, collection methods are often based on the wholesalers submitting their price and 
volume data. This has led to allegations of data manipulation by wholesalers that have an 
incentive to understate prices in order to artificially lower the farm gate prices (Spencer 2004, 
p.60). On the other hand, price monitoring by retailers may counteract the incentive to data 
manipulation. In summary, price information suffers several limitations that reduce its credibility, 
especially the difficulty in accounting for quality; nonetheless it is generally available and 
appears sufficient. 
 
When assessing market information, it is also important to consider the effects of arbitrage. 
Across distance, arbitrage is conducted by purchasing produce in a surplus market and 
transferring it to the deficit/shortage market for the price differential additional revenue. This 
activity should occur until the transfer costs are equal to the price differential and an equilibrium 
is established between the two central markets. Arbitrage assumes that agents are risk adverse 
and profit maximisers. In the absence of explicit transfer cost and trade flow information, the 
empirical method used to test the LOOP requires that transfer cost data be stationary during the 
sample period. 
 
The Adelaide and Melbourne central markets are relatively close in terms of distance, at 730km 
(Google Australia 2008). Therefore, if transfer costs are linearly related to distance, then these 
two markets are more likely to trade between each other rather than other markets. Figure 1 4 
 
suggests a relatively significant level of non-bulk trade which includes vegetables, occurring 
between Adelaide and Melbourne. Another indicator of tradeflow is that in 2005-06, 19% of total 
vegetable volume was sold interstate (Ashton 2007, p. 22). A large portion of this volume is sold 
in other wholesale markets.  However, the likelihood of a market boundary should be different 
for various products, as it depends on the value per unit. For instance, potatoes are a low value 
per unit product compared to mushrooms, making transfer costs a relatively more significant cost 
component.  
 
Transfer costs are generally known to be difficult to estimate, as they are highly variable between 
individuals and produce, and have been decreasing over time between markets. Figure 2 
estimates the road and rail non-bulk interstate transportation costs in real terms between 1964 
and 2001. The general price of road and rail freight has been declining since 1972. Since the 
introduction of articulated trucks in the 1970s, interstate non-bulk, including vegetables, road 
freight costs have halved in real terms (Productivity Commission 2006, p.32). The decrease in 
freight costs appears to be due to productivity improvements such as, information 
communication technology and more efficient trucks with greater capacity (Productivity 
Commission 2006, p.32). Figure 2 shows that the price of road transport has not changed 
considerably between 1988-89 and 2000-01. It has been characterised by low variance and a 
constant trend. When using time series analysis, it is important that transfer costs be stationary 
for the analysis to be accurate. Otherwise, we may incorrectly fail to reject that the LOOP holds. 
For transfer costs to be considered stationary, the mean, variance and covariance must be 
stationary over time. We assume, therefore, that transfer costs are stationary over the sample 
period of this study. For the purpose of the analysis, we extend these characteristics to suggest 
that over the 2006-2008 sample period transfer costs will be stationary. The short two-year 
sample period used in the study implies that this should be a reasonable assumption. 
 
Figure 1 Top 10 Auslink corridors by tonnage, 1999 (in '000 tonnes) 
Source: Bureau of Infastructure (2002) and Productivity Commission (2006, p.23) 5 
 
 
Figure 2 Road and rail interstate non-bulk freight rates in 2006 dollars 
Source: Bureau of Infrastructure (2002) and Productivity Commission (2006, p.32) 
 
Finally, information within these central markets is higher than alternative market systems, 
although this does not assist in generating information regarding other central markets. There is a 
distinct lack of volume information in these markets which is necessary in determining the 
supply conditions. However, price information is generally available to agents, although its key 
limitation is that it does not accurately account for changes in product quality. Arbitrage between 
Melbourne and Adelaide is highly likely to occur, as various trade statistics presented for goods 
with similar characteristics are shown to be high. In addition, the distance between locations is 
relatively short. As the presence of a market boundary is unlikely, the paucity of market 




3. Previous studies 
 
The literature treats pricing efficiency as tantamount to the LOOP. There is a lack of studies 
examining pricing efficiency in Australian wholesale vegetable markets, although there are 
general studies that show pricing efficiency has been positively affected by changes in the level 
of market information. The empirical approaches to measuring pricing efficiency have become 
more sophisticated over time, and culminated in two key models being employed in previous 
studies: switching regime and cointegration.  
 
Barrett and Li (2002) and McNew and Fackler (1996) consider pricing efficiency as a price- 
based view of the competitive market equilibrium, where arbitrage forces lead to prices in the 
two central markets equalising, net of transfer costs. This definition of pricing efficiency is 
synonymous to the LOOP (Barrett 2001). The difference between these two terms is the context 
in which they are used. Pricing efficiency is the outcome and the LOOP is the condition that 
must hold.  
 
Published research on Australian wholesale vegetable markets is scanty, especially with regard to 
pricing efficiency. The last known empirical study looking at pricing efficiency in Australian 
wholesale vegetable markets was an occasional paper by Weissel and Whittingham (1978). They 6 
 
used price information from 1969 to 1976, and focused on the larger central markets located in 
eastern states. Using cross spectral analysis, they concluded that prices were generally efficient. 
They also concluded that there was a limited opportunity for arbitrage of about eight weeks 
(Weissel and Whittingham 1978, p. 23). Australian wholesale vegetable markets have since been 
privatised, and market information services regarding volumes have been reduced. Other studies 
analysing these markets, although not dealing with pricing efficiency directly, have been based 
on analytics and anecdotal evidence from market agents, including the Industry Commission 
(1993), Spencer (2004) and the ACCC (2008). The consensus in these studies is that prices 
appear to be determined largely by supply and demand conditions, although they also suggest 
that market information is problematic. 
 
Sporadically, there have been international studies undertaken on the effects of market 
information on price efficiency. Buccola (1985) found that central markets were more price 
efficient than other market systems as a result of lower search costs between suppliers and 
demanders in discovering the general market conditions. There have also been studies looking 
into the relationship between market information and pricing efficiency. Anderson et al. (1998) 
using simulation demonstrated that decreasing price and quantity information leads to higher 
price variance and lower pricing efficiency. Bastian et al. (2001) go a step further, and use 
simulation to show that mandatory price reporting reduces price levels and variance, while price 
efficiency improves. Market information, therefore, should have a positive effect on price 
efficiency based on a priori expectation. 
 
Empirical testing of pricing efficiency using the LOOP has undergone much development since 
the initial use of correlation and static regression by Richardson (1978); Protopapadakis and Stoll 
(1983). Currently, there are two main approaches used by researchers testing the LOOP: 
switching regime models and cointegration. A switching regime model was applied by Spiller 
and Huang (1986), employing three different trading regimes, the probabilities of each regime 
occurring are estimated. Sexton et al. (1991) also used a similar approach to test for the LOOP in 
a unidirectional trade situation by defining the regimes as different arbitrage possibilities rather 
than the trade possibilities used by Spiller and Huang (1986). A significant advantage is the 
incorporation of the variation in transaction costs over time (Baulch 1997). Models that fail to 
account for this transaction cost variation, such as cointegration, may tend to over-reject the 
LOOP (for example, Barrett and Li 2002; Goodwin and Grennes 1998). Although the switching 
regime model addresses problems of other models, it faces limitations of its own.  The 
interpretations of results from switching regime models are sensitive to the underlying 
distributional assumptions, particularly where economic theory makes no recommendation about 
a distribution (Barrett and Li 2002; Fackler et al. 2001; McNew and Fackler 1997). Also spatial 
regime models assume that the tendency of locations to adhere to the LOOP is constant with 
respect to time, which may be implausible, when policies that are employed over time may 
increase the pricing efficiency of markets up to the LOOP such as investment in transportation 
and communication infrastructure. By relaxing the assumption that prices adjust instantaneously, 
cointegration can be used to test the LOOP as a spatial equilibrium. Generally speaking, 
therefore, cointegration is a test using time series data for establishing whether or not a long-run 
equilibrium relationship exists between variables. Ardeni (1989) demonstrates that cointegration 
is a better price-based method than earlier approaches such as correlation and static regression, 
as it does not suffer from spurious problems. Since most economic time series are non-stationary, 7 
 
cointegration appears to be a relevant method, as linear regression is not valid because normal 
inference theory is not applicable to non-stationary data (Engle and Granger 1987; Gujarati 
1988; Vinuya 2007). Although cointegration does have problems, it is still useful. If the transfer 
costs are non-stationary and there is no evidence of trade between two markets, cointegration is 
not informative (McNew and Fackler 1997; Barrett and Li 2002). Ultimately the problem is not 
with cointegration, but with the level of data available. The use of only price-based data means 
that the reliability of empirical results is reduced. Finally, for more informative results, actual 
trade flow and transfer cost information should be incorporated (Barrett 1996; McNew and 
Fackler 1997).  
 
 
4. Analytical framework 
 
When markets are efficiently priced, agents must be informed about prices in other spatial 
locations. Assuming agents are rational and no trade restrictions, arbitrage activity occurs up to 
the point where the difference in price is equal to transfer costs. An equilibrium price will emerge 
between the two locations. This captures the core of the LOOP. The LOOP is discussed 
particularly with respect to a more relaxed variant named the weak LOOP, which is an 
equilibrium condition, more applicable to these markets. The equilibrium property is important 
in terms of the applicability of cointegration as the empirical method used in this paper. 
 
Mathematically, Equations (1) and (2) show the strong and weak LOOP conditions, respectively.
t P, 1 and  t P , 2 are the prices in locations 1 and 2. In addition,  t T , 2 1− represents all the costs associated 
with the movement of the goods from one location to the other. Transfer costs include the costs 
of transportation, information, storage and handling costs (Rapsomanikis et al. 2006; Tomek and 
Robinson 1990). If Equation (1) is satisfied the strong LOOP holds. Arbitrage forces should not 
allow the price difference to exceed the transfer cost. 
 
t t t T P P , 2 1 , 2 , 1 − = −             (1) 
t t t T P P , 2 1 , 2 , 1 − ≤ −
            (2) 
 
Equation (2) is referred to as the weak LOOP, because it relaxes the equality sign in Equation (1) 
by allowing prices to move by no more than transfer costs. This is also known as the spatial 
arbitrage condition as suggested by Fackler et al. 2001. They propose that the weak LOOP is an 
equilibrium condition. The reasoning is that in Equation (1) the observed price differential may 
be less than the transfer costs with no force to raise it back to the equality, which is known as the 
transfer band. On the other hand, in Equation (2) the transfer band is acknowledged and 
accepted, in the long run. However, spatial arbitrage opportunities will lead to the price 
differential between the two markets approaching transfer costs.  
 
The fact that the weak loop condition is an equilibrium condition suggests that cointegration is a 
suitable empirical approach to testing. Cointegration is useful because it signifies the existence of 
a long-run equilibrium relationship between time-series variables. If two non-stationary price 
series are cointegrated, they move together linearly in the long run, while in the short run they 
may drift apart. This characteristic is entirely applicable to the markets, as in the short run 8 
 
delivery lags and grower-wholesaler relationships prevent the instantaneous adjustment of prices 
required in Equation (1). In the long run, this should not be an issue as spatial arbitrage will 
ensure that price divergence is not permanent. 
 
The weak LOOP is an equilibrium condition which is more suitable to the nature of Australian 
wholesale vegetable markets. Transportation lags and the stickiness of grower-wholesaler 
relationships imply that the LOOP is more applicable as a long-run equilibrium concept. The 
weak LOOP and the timely nature of any long-run equilibrium relationship suggest that 
cointegration is a relatively strong empirical counterpart. Therefore, the weak LOOP will be used 
to test the price efficiency between Adelaide and Melbourne central markets. 
 
5. Data and empirical procedures 
 
Wholesale price information for three common vegetables that are sold in Adelaide and 
Melbourne will be used to test if the LOOP holds. The price data are generally characterised by 
low levels of variance which can be explained by changes in supply conditions. In order to test 
the LOOP, the Johansen cointegration test is used as well as Granger causality and impulse 
response functions.    
 
The products considered need to be homogeneous in the Adelaide and Melbourne markets so that 
retailers do not have different willingnesses to pay. This has been achieved by controlling 
product size, state of origin and specific vegetable crop variety. Product quality, however, could 
potentially be a significant factor that has not been accounted for.  The vegetable products of 
various package sizes used are carrots, potatoes, and tomatoes. These vegetables are high selling 
in the markets. Specifically, they include large Western Australian carrots (per carton), washed 
white cocktail South Australian potatoes (per 15kg carton) and cherry red Queensland tomatoes 
(per 250gram punnet). Weekly time series is used which varies in sample period depending on 
the vegetable product. The longest sample is potatoes from June 2006 to June 2008 and the 
shortest is tomatoes between 2006 and December 2007. The number of observations for each 
vegetable is shown in Table 1. Although the sample sizes are sufficiently large, cointegration is a 
long-run concept and may be limited due to the relatively short time span. The data are sourced 
from their respective official market reporting services and collected voluntarily from 
wholesalers. The Adelaide and Melbourne wholesale price data were collected by the Adelaide 
Produce Markets limited and the Victorian Chamber of Fresh Produce Wholesalers Incorporated, 
respectively. 
 
The price series is characterised by low levels of variation, as shown in Table 1 and Figures 3, 4 
and 5. This can be explained by the differing perishability and supply conditions for these staple 
vegetables. While demand is relatively constant all year for these vegetables, the price of 
tomatoes is the most varied, as they are far more perishable and more sensitive to supply factors 
such as weather conditions in comparison to those for carrots and potatoes. Furthermore, a 
statistical explanation could suggest that average price data collected do not accurately reflect the 
variations in product quality (Industry Commission 1993 and Spencer 2004).  Although the 
variation is lower than expected, there are some periods of constant prices. However, it is 
believed the two price series vary sufficiently for testing cointegration. 
 9 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of wholesale price information used. 
Product  Central 
market 
Observations  Mean price  Standard 
deviation 
Correlation 





































































































































































































































Figure 5 Large Western Australia carrots wholesale prices (per carton) 
 
The empirical procedures are adopted from Rapsomanikis et.al (2006) who use the Johansen 
cointegration as a test for the LOOP. First, the wholesale prices are tested for the order of their 
stationarity, using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips Perron (PP) tests. If the null 
hypothesis that a unit root exists is rejected by the ADF and PP tests of order d, we conclude that 
it is integrated of order I(d).  In the event that price series for the same product in different 
markets are both integrated of the same order, which is commonly I(1), we test further for 
cointegration, using Engle Granger (Engle and Granger 1987) and the Johansen tests (Johansen 
1988; Johansen 1991) . However, if both price series are integrated of different orders, we reject 
the notion that they are cointegrated, and suggest that these markets do not satisfy the LOOP. 
Granger causality and impulse response functions are also performed to assess the direction and 
size of influence, if any, between Adelaide and Melbourne markets.  
 
If both price series are integrated of the same order, i.e. I(1), the Engle Granger and Johansen 
cointegration procedures are used to assess if prices are cointegrated. To be cointegrated the 
Engle Granger procedure requires that the ordinary least squares residual series of the two price 
series be I(0). This is done by testing for unit roots with the ADF and PP tests.  The Engle 
Granger procedure does not have the capacity for hypothesis testing necessary for the LOOP. 
However, the Johansen test allows a hypothesis test for the LOOP. The Johansen procedure is 
also used to complement the Engle Granger procedure. 
 
Both a trace test and a maximum eigenvalue test are used to identify the rank of the cointegration 
vector. In short, if the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected, using the trace and 
maximum eigenvalue tests, we conclude in favour of a cointegrated relationship between the two 
price series. The LOOP requires the cointegrating vector β  to be equal to 1 and for the estimated 
residual to be distributed 0,
2 σ (Ahmadi-Esfahani 2006; Palaskas and Harriss-White 1993).  
 
The Johansen approach can be summarised in vector autoregression form of price series 
￿￿,￿ and ￿￿,￿ as being equal to a sum of their past values. ￿
￿￿




￿ is a matrix of coefficients to lagged price series, ￿
￿￿,￿￿￿
￿￿,￿￿￿￿. In addition, ￿
￿￿,￿
￿￿,￿￿ is a 

































































































































































































￿￿,￿￿     (3) 
        
Extending Equation (3) by allowing each matrix of coefficient for lagged values of P to be 
represented by ￿￿,…￿￿, and adding k lags gives VAR(k) Equation (4)                    











￿￿,￿￿     (4) 
 
In terms of vector error correction modelling notation Equation (4) is represented as    








￿￿,￿￿    (5) 
 
￿￿￿ ￿ …￿ ￿￿ ￿  ! is the rank of the matrix which is equal to the number of cointegrating 
vectors b.  If b =1, then the price series are cointegrated. If b = 0 or 2, then the price series are 
not cointegrated or stationary respectively. The cointegrating vector is tested, using the 
maximum eigenvalue and trace tests. In order to put Equation (5) in error correction form, 
Johansen(1991) defined the rank of the matrix as ￿￿￿ ￿ …￿ ￿￿ ￿  ! ="#’, where " is the speed 
of adjustment parameter and # is the cointegrating parameter and measures the long-run 
relationship. 
  
Finally, the LOOP suggests that price adjustment should be instantaneous. In reality, however, 
price leadership may occur from a source of new information or a larger market.  Granger 
causality and impulse response functions are used as the final and supplementary step to 
cointegration. The Granger causality test measures, if added past values of the other market 
price, say  t P, 1 , improves the explanation of the current price in t P , 2 . Granger causality indicates 
the direction of information flow and precedence between the markets, but not causality of the 
price. Impulse response functions are then applied which aim to quantify the speed of adjustment 
in the price in one market from a shock in the other price. That is, Granger causality attempts to 
detect the direction of information flows while impulse response functions measure the speed of 




Despite promising results in the form of high bi-variate correlation findings shown in Table 1, 
the main testing procedure rejects the proposition that the LOOP is satisfied between Adelaide 
and Melbourne markets. Granger causality testing generally indicates that the Melbourne prices 
leads the Adelaide prices, while arbitrage opportunities generally are eliminated in about a 
month’s time frame. 
 
Large Western Australian carton of carrots and washed white cocktail South Australian potatoes 
have a high correlation of almost 0.8 which implies that they are close to satisfying the LOOP. 
The LOOP is considered to hold, if prices are correlated with a coefficient of one. This means 
that prices in the two markets are perfectly positively synchronised. The correlation results of 
this analysis suffer from spuriousness which leads to an upward bias in the correlation 
coefficient. This is because only one price series was stationary without the need for 
differencing. Based on the ADF and PP tests for stationarity, all price series were non-stationary 12 
 
except for washed white cocktail potatoes from South Australia sold in Melbourne which was 
I(0). All the price series were found to be stationary after first differencing, I(1), except for 
washed white cocktail potatoes from South Australia sold in Melbourne. Prices may be 
correlated because of common factors such as inflation, seasonality, supply and demand shocks 
or environmental factors simultaneously (Delgado 1986;Harriss 1993). It is possible that they 
could also independently vary within the band of inactivity which is the size of the transfer costs. 
Based on the Johansen cointegration and Engle Granger tests, the hypothesis that the LOOP is 
satisfied in the Adelaide and Melbourne wholesale vegetable markets is rejected. Table 2 shows 
the Johansen cointegration test findings which suggest that the result of non-rejection of the null 
hypothesis for the trace and maximum eigen value tests at the five per cent level of significance, 
leading to the conclusion that the LOOP is not satisfied in these markets for the products 
examined. Engle Granger cointegration testing was also completed and confirmed that the LOOP 
was not satisfied at all reasonable levels of significance. Although high correlation coefficients 
suggested satisfaction of the LOOP was possible, post the elimination of spuriousness issues in 
the price series, the hypothesis that the price series were cointegrated was rejected, yielding, the 
conclusion that the LOOP does not appear to hold in these markets. 
 
Granger causality provides results to imply that information flows from the larger market 
Melbourne to the smaller market Adelaide. The results of the Granger causality tests are 
presented in Table 3. They show that the Melbourne price precedes Adelaide’s for washed white 
cocktail potatoes from South Australia. This suggests that demand shocks from the larger market 
impact on the smaller Adelaide market. Supply shocks would lead to Granger causality in 
reverse, from the source of supply to the market of demand. Furthermore, through the use of 
impulse response functions, which traces out the response of one price series to a shock in the 
other price series, we see that speed of the information flow is estimated to takes approximately 
five weeks to complete for potatoes from Adelaide to Melbourne and vice versa. Cherry red 
tomatoes from Queensland are relatively faster adjusting in four weeks, while large carrots from 
Western Australia take a long time respond to price shocks between these markets. Granger 
causality testing of the potatoes is significant, as the potatoes are sourced from South Australia, 
although the Melbourne prices precede the Adelaide prices which suggest that the information 
flows from Melbourne, the demand market, to Adelaide, the supply market. The speed of 
information flow was estimated, using impulse response functions which show that it takes about 
a month for the tomatoes and potatoes to complete information flows. 
 
Promising correlation results did not translate into the price series being cointegrated. It was 
concluded that the high correlation coefficient results in Table 1 were biased upward due to the 
effects of spuriousness. Cointegration findings from the use of both the Engle Granger and 
Johansen tests led to the same result. The conclusion was that the price series for the potatoes, 
carrots and tomatoes sold in the Adelaide and Melbourne Wholesale markets were not 
cointegrated and, therefore, did not satisfy the LOOP. Granger causality tests and impulse 
response functions testing resulted in the finding that information flows from the larger demand 






Table 2 Johansen cointegration test findings 





















test*  Remarks 
Large WA carrots carton 
MEL-
ADE  None  1 to 2  72  14.35  10.69  15.49  14.26  Non-rejection of null indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
    At most 1  1 to 2  72  3.66  3.66  3.84  3.84  Non-rejection of null indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
Cherry red QLD tomatoes 
MEL-
ADE  None  1 to 2  66  12.51  9.1  15.49  14.26  Non-rejection of null indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
      At most 1  1 to 2  66  3.41  3.41  3.84  3.84  Non-rejection of null indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
       





Table 3 Granger causality findings 









statistics  Remarks    
Large WA carrots carton 
Adelaide Granger causes 
Melbourne  70  4.24***  Do not reject null   
 
Melbourne Granger causes 
Adelaide  70  1.93  Reject null   
Washed white cocktail SA potatoes 15kg bag 
Adelaide Granger causes 
Melbourne  87  0.49  Reject null   
 
Melbourne Granger causes 
Adelaide  87  2.88***  Do not reject null   
Cherry red QLD tomatoes 250gm punnet 
Adelaide Granger causes 
Melbourne  59  0.48  Reject null   
  
Melbourne Granger causes 
Adelaide  59  1.27  Reject null    
         15 
 
7. Policy implications 
 
The LOOP appears useful in evaluating the pricing efficiency of markets. If the LOOP is not 
satisfied it implies that pricing signals are inefficient. These signals are transmitted vertically and 
horizontally throughout the supply chain, implying that market agents are acting on less than 
informative market signals resulting in a misallocation of resources and ultimately higher prices 
for consumers. Using weekly average wholesale price data for three popular vegetable products 
in the Adelaide and Melbourne markets, the LOOP was tested using cointegration. The key 
finding from this study is that the LOOP does not appear to hold in the Adelaide and Melbourne 
markets.  
 
These findings lead to the conclusion that these markets are not priced efficiently, as there is no 
sign of cointegration between the wholesale price series. The findings of this analysis are, 
therefore, in contrast to the findings presented by the ACCC (2008) which was based on 
analytics and anecdotal evidence from market agents. Pricing efficiency is promoted by the 
effective and timely communication of market information. A policy recommendation stemming 
from this study is that the general level of market information should be improved. Particularly 
volume and trade flow information needs to be enhanced. It has been demonstrated elsewhere in 
the past, with experimental simulation, that reduced public information leads to decreased 
pricing efficiency (Anderson et al. 1998), while mandatory price reporting has the opposite effect 
(Bastian et al. 2001). Mandatory price reporting by wholesalers constitutes one possible way to 
increase market information. The development of information communication technology such 
as the internet should be a central tool in any information dissemination mix developed. The 
internet provides information instantly, is easily accessible and happens to be cost effective.  
 
Although this study contains limitations regarding the empirical procedures and the short time 
span of the price series, it does highlight the need for greater emphasis on empirical analysis of 
market performance in Australia. There is great potential value and opportunities for future 
research in applied market performance analysis in Australian supply chains. Further research 
can extend this study by incorporating the entire network of Australian wholesale vegetable 
markets into the analysis. What also may be done is to use the superior switching regime 
modelling approach to testing the LOOP. If explicit transfer cost and tradeflow data are 
unavailable, it is suggested that simulation techniques might be used. 
 
 
8.  Concluding comments 
Australian vegetable wholesale markets face challenges regarding the levels of market 
information. There is very limited empirical literature regarding pricing efficiency in these 
markets. By testing whether or not the LOOP holds in the Adelaide and Melbourne markets, we 
were able to test the pricing efficiency of these markets. Using cointegration and wholesale 
average price information, we conclude that prices do not appear to satisfy the LOOP. This 
indicates a less than efficient allocation of resources in these markets, implying that the general 
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